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ABSTRACT
Numerous methods for craing adversarial examples were proposed
recently with high success rate. Most existing works normalize
images into a continuous, real vector, domain rstly, and then
cra adversarial examples in this domain. However, “adversarial”
examples may become benign aer de-normalizing them back into
the discrete integer domain, known as the discretization problem.
e discretization problem was mentioned in some work, but was
underestimated and has received relatively lile aention.
In this work, we conduct the rst comprehensive study of the
discretization problem. We theoretically analyze 34 representative
methods and empirically study 20 representative open source tools
for craing adversarial images. Our study reveals that almost all
existing works suer from the discretization problem and it is far
more serious than originally thought. For instance, most black-box
methods downgrade to white-box ones and methods having higher
success rates drop down to lower high success rates, e.g., from
100% to 10%. is suggests that the discretization problem should
be taken into account when craing adversarial examples. As a
rst step towards addressing this problem, we propose a black-box
method which reduces the adversarial example searching problem
to a derivative-free optimization problem. Our method is able
to cra “real” adversarial images by derivative-free search on the
discrete integer domain. Experimental results show that our method
achieves signicantly higher success rate in terms of adversarial
examples in the discrete integer domain than most other methods,
no maer white-box or black-box. Moreover, our method is able to
handle models that is non-dierentiable and successfully break the
winner of NIPS 17 competition on defense with 95% success rate.
CCS CONCEPTS
•Security and privacy → Usability in security and privacy;
•Computing methodologies→ Machine learning;
KEYWORDS
Adversarial examples; deep neural networks; discretization; black-
box aacks; derivative-free optimization
1 INTRODUCTION
In the past 10 years, machine learning algorithms, fueled by massive
amounts of data, achieve human-level performance or beer on a
number of tasks. Models produced by machine learning algorithms,
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especially deep neural networks, are increasingly being deployed in
a variety of applications, including safety-critical applications, such
as autonomous driving [3, 30, 79], medical diagnostics [16, 57, 66],
speech processing [29], computer vision [35, 40], robotics [45, 84],
natural language processing [2, 59], and cyber-security [62, 67, 70].
In the early stage of machine learning, people pay more aen-
tion on the basic theory and application research, although it is
known in 2004 that machine learning models are oen vulnerable
to adversarial manipulation of their input intended to cause mis-
classication [17]. In 2014, Szegedy et al. proposed the concept
of adversarial examples for the rst time in deep neural network
seing [75]. By adding a subtle perturbation to the input of the
deep neural network, it results in a misclassication. Moreover,
a relatively large fraction of adversarial examples can be used to
aack models that have dierent architectures and training data.
Since the ndings of Szegedy et al. [75], a plethora of studies
have shown that the state-of-the-art deep neural networks suer
from the adversarial example aacks which can lead to severe
consequences when applied to real-world applications [4, 6, 8–10,
12–14, 22, 25, 32, 33, 38, 41, 46, 51, 53, 55, 56, 58, 65, 77, 80, 82, 85].
In the literature, there are mainly two types of complementary
techniques: testing based [4, 6, 8, 14, 22, 32, 33, 41, 48, 51, 53, 55,
58, 75, 77, 80] and verication based [23, 26, 36, 58, 60, 68, 69, 80]
for craing adversarial examples. According to the adversary’s
knowledge and capabilities, both white-box [4, 22, 23, 26, 36, 48, 51,
53, 58, 58, 60, 68, 75] and black-box [6, 8, 14, 32, 33, 41, 55, 77, 80, 80]
methods have been proposed.
Prior explorations of adversarial examples largely focus on digital
adversarial examples [10, 14, 23, 25, 51, 53, 80]. More recently,
researchers started to study physical adversarial examples. Kurakin
et al. showed that there is a big gap between adversarial examples
in the digital world and in the physical world, which means the
adversarial perturbations that generalize well in the digital world
may not generalize to the physical world [41].
In this work, we rene digital adversarial examples into adver-
sarial examples in a continuous (real) domain (e.g., [0, 1]m ) and
in a discrete (integer) domain (e.g., {0, · · · , 255}m ). Adversarial
examples respectively in the continuous domain and in the discrete
domain are called real adversarial examples and integer adversarial
examples. Traditional aacks rst normalize an input image from
a discrete domain into a continuous domain, then cra adversarial
examples in the continuous domain and nally denormalize (e.g.,
discretizate) real adversarial examples back into the discrete domain.
However, real adversarial examples may become benign aer the
denormalization post-processing, which is called the discretization
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problem in [10]. is discretization problem was initially consid-
ered by Goodfellow et al. [25] and Papernot et al. [56]. A follow-up
paper [10] formally mentioned this problem. However, it seems
that the discretization problem was underestimated in the literature
and has received relatively lile aention. For instance, Carlini
and Wanger [10] stated that “is rounding will slightly degrade
the quality of the adversarial example”. ere is a lack of study
on eects of the discretization problem: e.g., to what extent do
the discretization problem aect the aack success rate and is the
discretization problem ubiquitous?
In this work, we conduct the rst comprehensive study of the
discretization problem on adversarial examples in image classi-
cation domain which has a plethora of studies1. We rst discuss
the dierence between adversarial examples in the continuous do-
main and in the discrete domain, as well as distance metrics which
are commonly used to approximate human’s perception of visual
dierence. en, we revise the denition of black-box aacks.
Next, we theoretically analyze 34 representative methods for
craing adversarial examples. We study whether the method cras
real or integer adversarial examples, whether there is gap between
the real adversarial examples and the examples aer denormaliza-
tion post-processing, and whether the authors are aware of the
discretization problem and take it into account. We nd that al-
most all of them cra real adversarial examples and 26 of them are
aected by the discretization problem. Moreover, most methods
that are claimed as black-box downgrade to white-box, and many
complete verication methods are limited to a continuous domain
only, which become incomplete in the discrete domain. To conrm
that these works do be aected by the discretization problem in
real-world, we carry out an empirical evaluation of 20 representa-
tive open source tools. Our empirical study shows that 16 of them
are aected, and many of adversarial examples craed by these
tools become benign aer denormalization. Moreover, there are
10 tools whose gap between real and integer adversarial examples
exceeds 50%. Our study reveals that the discretization problem is
far more serious than originally thought and suggests that the dis-
cretization problem should be taken into account when craing digital
adversarial examples and measuring aack success rate.
A naive idea to avoid the discretization problem is to guaran-
tee that no gap occurs when denormalizing the real adversarial
examples back into the discrete domain. However, this requires
access to the denormalization and the aack become grey-box,
which is not always feasible in practice. A “real” black-box aack
should not have access to the model, as well as the normalization
and denormalization. Existing black-box aacks that rely on the
transferability property of adversarial examples may can avoid this
problem, but require a model that is similar to the target model and
re-trained on a similar dataset.
As the second main contribution of this work, we propose a
black-box algorithm for craing integer adversarial examples for
both target and untargeted aacks. Our method only requires
access to the probability distribution of classes for each test input,
hence is a real black-box aack. We formalize the computation of
integer adversarial examples as a black-box discrete optimization
1Learning algorithms on other problems using discretization may have similar problem.
We leave it as future work.
problem constrained with a L∞ distance, where L∞ is dened in
the discrete domain as well. However, this discrete optimization
problem cannot be solved using gradient-based methods, as the
model is non-continuous. To solve this problem, we leverage a
model-based derivative-free discrete optimization method that does
not rely on the gradient of the objective function, but instead, learns
from samples of the search space. It is suitable for optimizing
functions that are non-dierentiable, with many local minima, or
even unknown but only testable.
We demonstrate the eectiveness of our method on the MNIST
dataset [44] using the LeNet-1 model [43]; and the ImageNet dataset [18]
using the ResNet50 [27] and InceptionV3 [74] models. Our method
achieves comparable aack success rates against the white-box
based aacks: Fast Gradient Sign Method (FGSM) [25] and C&W [10],
and signicantly outperforms the popular “black”-box based at-
tacks: ZOO [12], decision-based aack [8], query-limited aack
NES-PGD [33], substitute model based black-box aacks with FGSM [25]
and C&W [10]. In terms of time performance, our aack is compa-
rable to the other black-box methods. Nevertheless, the query times
of our method is much less than NES-PGD [33] and Bandit [34],
which are specially designed for query-limited scenarios. Moreover,
our method is able to break the HGD defense [47], which won the
rst place of NIPS 2017 competition on defense against adversarial
aacks, with 95% success rate, and also achieves the so-far best
success rate of white-box aacks in the online MNIST Adversarial
Examples Challenge [42].
Our contributions in this paper include:
• We theoretically analyze 34 representative methods for craing
adversarial examples, and nd that 26 of them are aected by
the discretization problem, and almost all the black-box aacks
downgrade to white-box ones.
• We empirically evaluate 20 representative open source tools that
can cra adversarial examples, and nd that 16 of them have
a gap of the success rate between real and integer adversarial
examples, and the gap of 10 tools exceeds 50%.
• We propose a “real” black-box algorithm for craing integer
adversarial examples for both target and untargeted aacks by
leveraging a derivative-free discrete optimization method. Our
method can aack machine learning models that are even not
dierentiable.
• We show that our aack can achieve beer success rates in terms
of the integer adversarial examples, than several existing popular
white-box and black-box tools.
• We demonstrate that our aack can be used as a query-ecient
black-box aack. It uses 600 to 2000 query times less than NES-
PGD and Bandit, which are specially designed for query-limited
scenarios.
• Our aack is able to break the HGD defense [47], which won the
rst place of NIPS 2017 competition on defense against adver-
sarial aacks, with 95% success rate, and also achieves the same
result as the best white-box aack in MNIST Challenge.
To the best of our knowledge, this is the rst comprehensive
study of the discretization problem on adversarial examples.
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Notations Description
w , h, ch the width, height, and number of chan-
nels of an image
P the set of coordinates w × h × ch.
V the continuous (real) domain of images
®v , e.g.,Rw×h×ch[0,1] .
®v[p] = (r1, · · · , rch ) the element at the coordinate p of a real
image ®v ∈ V.
D the discrete (integer) domain of integer
images ®d , e.g.,Nw×h×ch[0,255] .
®d[p] = (r1, · · · , rch ) the element at the coordinate p of an
integer image ®d ∈ D.
®v, ®vadv ∈ V real image ®v and its real adversarial ex-
ample ®vadv.
®d, ®dadv ∈ D integer image ®d and its integer adver-
sarial example ®dadv.
T : D→ V the normalizer that transforms an inte-
ger image into a real one.
T−1 : V→ D the denormalizer that transforms a real
image to an integer one such that ∀ ®d ∈
D, T−1(T( ®d)) = ®d .
Ct the set of mutually exclusive classes for
the classication task t .
Table 1: Notations used in this paper.
2 BACKGROUND
In this section, we srt introduce the notations of deep learning
based image classication and adversarial examples, then discuss
the discretization problem. For convenient reference, we summarize
the notations in Table 1.
2.1 Deep Learning based Image Classication
e goal of an image classication task t is to construct a classier
ft : D→ Ct . With a normalizer T : D→ V, the goal is approxi-
mately achieved by constructing a classier дt : V→ Ct such that
ft = дt ◦T.
Deep learning methods are used to compute a classier д̂t :
V → Ct as an approximation of дt . Consider the supervised
learning task t , let (d, cd )d ∈D be a nite set of labelled data, where
cd ∈ Ct denotes the class of the image d ∈ D. e labelled dataset
(d, cd )d ∈D is normalized into the dataset (v, cv )v ∈V by the normal-
izer T, where V = {T(d) | d ∈ D} and cv = cd if c = T(d) for
d ∈ D andv ∈ V . A deep neural network is trained and tuned based
on labelled dataset (v, cv )v ∈V , which results in the approximate
classier д̂t . Finally, the classier ft is approximated by the func-
tion f̂t := д̂t ◦T. Figure 1 depicts the relationship between these
notations for convenient.
2.2 Real Adversarial Example Attacks
Given a classier д̂t and a real image ®v ∈ V that may be obtained
from an integer image ®d ∈ D via the normalizer T, an real adver-
sarial example for ®v and д̂t is a real image ®vadv ∈ V such that
D V V D
ft дt
f̂t д̂t (v, cd )v∈V (d, cd )d∈D
TDeep
learningT
T−1
T
T−1
≈ ≈
Figure 1: Relationship between classiers in continuous and
discrete domains, where
T^ denotes applying the normalizer
T on (d, cd )d ∈D and other arrows labelled byT orT−1 denote
function composition.
д̂t (®v) , д̂t (®vadv),
i.e., the classier д̂t misclassies the example ®vadv.
An untargeted aack against the classier д̂t is to cra a real
adversarial example ®vadv for a given real image ®v ∈ V. A more
powerful aack, targeted aack, for a given target class c is to cra
a real adversarial example ®vadv such that д̂t (®vadv) = c .
Depending on the knowledge of the classier д̂t by the adver-
sary, aacks are broadly categorized into white-box and black-box
aacks. In white-box scenario, the adversary knows the parameters
and architecture of д̂t , even defense and detection algorithms if
they exist, while in black-box scenario, the adversary only have
access to the probabilities of top-k classes for each test input. In
a less powerful black-box scenario, the number of queries to the
classier д̂t is also limited.
2.3 e Discretization Problem
Given an integer image ®d ∈ D, and a classier д̂t with the nor-
malizer T and denormalizer T−1, suppose we have craed a real
adversarial example ®vadv from the real image T( ®d), i.e.,
д̂t (T( ®d)) , д̂t (®vadv).
To show or store ®vadv, ®vadv will be denormalized into the integer
image T−1(®vadv). e discretization problem occurs when
T(T−1(®vadv)) , ®vadv.
is discretization problem may results in severe consequence,
namely,
д̂t (T(T−1(®vadv))) , д̂t (®vadv),
which further, results in failure of targeted/untargeted aacks, i.e.,
д̂t (T(T−1(®vadv))) = д̂t (T( ®d)) or д̂t (T(T−1(®vadv))) , c .
where c denotes the target class. erefore, we introduce the con-
cept of integer adversarial examples.
2.4 Integer Adversarial Example Attacks
Due to the discretization problem, an image classier should be de-
ned as a pair (д̂t ,T) consisting of an classier д̂t and its normalizer
T rather than the individual classier д̂t .
Given a classier (д̂t ,T) and an integer image ®d ∈ D, an integer
adversarial example for ®d is an integer image ®dadv ∈ D such that
д̂t (T( ®d)) , д̂t (T( ®dadv)).
Consequently, an untargeted aack against a classier (д̂t ,T) is
to cra an integer adversarial example ®dadv from an integer image
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®d ∈ D. A targeted aack for a given target class c is to cra an
integer adversarial example ®dadv such that
д̂t (T( ®dadv)) = c .
In terms of white-box, the adversary may knows the normal-
izer, denormalizer, parameters and architecture of the classier,
then, the adversary can search integer adversarial examples of ®d
by rst searching real examples ®vadv of T( ®d) and then checking
whether the corresponding integer image T−1(®vadv) is adversar-
ial or matches the targeted class. However, in terms of black-box,
the adversary can only access to the probabilities of top-k classes
for each input, then the adversary cannot search integer adversar-
ial examples ®dadv in the continuous domain, unless the adversary
knows the normalizer and denormalizer, hence, downgrades to
white-box. (Indeed, it downgrades to grey-box. In this work, we
regard grey-box as white-box for simplifying the presentation.)
2.5 Distance Metrics
e distortion of adversarial examples should be visually indistin-
guishable from their normal counterparts by humans. However, it
is hard to model human perception, hence several distance metrics
were proposed to approximate human’s perception of visual dif-
ference. In the literature, there are four common distance metrics
L0, L1, L2 and L∞ which are usually dened over samples in the
continuous domainV. All of them are Ln norms which is dened
as
‖ ®v − ®vadv‖n =
(∑
p∈P
®v[p] − ®vadv[p]n ) 1n ,
where ®v, ®vadv ∈ V.
In more detail, n = 0 for L0 counts the number of dierent pixels,
i.e.,
∑
p∈P (®v[p] , ®vadv[p]). n = 1 for L1 denotes the sum of absolute
dierences of each pixel value, i.e.,
∑
p∈P (
®v[p] − ®vadv[p]). n = 2
for L2 denotes Euclidean or root-mean-square distance. n = ∞ for
L∞ measures the largest change introduced. Remark that
limn→∞ ‖ ®v − ®vadv‖n = max{
®v[p] − ®vadv[p] | p ∈ P}.
However, for a given distance metric Ln , ‖ ®vadv −T( ®d)‖n may
dier from ‖T(T−1(®vadv)) − T( ®d)‖n . Consequently, it is not rea-
sonable to approximate human’s perception of visual dierence
using distance metrics dened between real examples. Instead, it is
much beer to measure the distance between integer images. For
this purpose, we revise distance metrics and introduce Lp norm
which is dened between integer images. Formally, Ln is dened
as follows:
‖ ®d − ®dadv‖n =
(∑
p∈P
 ®d[p] − ®dadv[p]n ) 1n ,
where ®d, ®dadv ∈ D. Accordingly, we can dene L0 = ‖ ®d − ®dadv‖0,
L1 = ‖ ®d − ®dadv‖1, L2 = ‖ ®d − ®dadv‖2 and L∞ = ‖ ®d − ®dadv‖∞.
Obviously, Ln diers from Ln for any n.
3 DISCRETIZATION PROBLEM IN THEWILD
In this section, we rst theoretically analyze 34 representative meth-
ods for craing adversarial examples, then conduct an empirical
study of 20 representative open source tools that can cra adver-
sarial examples, on the discretization problem.
3.1 eoretical Study
Let us x a classier д̂t for an image classication task t , suppose
®v ∈ V is the real image from the integer image ®d ∈ D using
a normalizer T and the target class is c for targeted aack. We
assume that д̂t (®v) = c ®v , c and the loss function is denoted by
loss : V ×Ct → R.
We theoretically analyze existing works in the following aspects:
testing vs. verication, and black-box vs. white-box. e summary
of results is given in Table 2 and Table 3.
3.1.1 Testing based White-box Methods. We classify test-
ing based white-box methods along two dimensions: gradient-based
and non-gradient-based methods.
Gradient-based methods. Goodfellow et al. [25] proposed the
rst and fastest gradient-based method (named FGSM). By lineariz-
ing the loss function loss(®vadv, c ®v ), FGSM computes a perturbation
of the image ®v by maximizing the loss subject to a L∞ constraint:
®vadv = ®v + ϵ sign(∇ ®vloss(®v, c ®v )), where the hyper-parameter ϵ
denotes the step size for each pixel and sign(·) is the sign function.
Inspired by FGSM, several gradient-based methods were proposed.
Kurakin et al. [41] introduced an extension of FGSM, called Basic
Iterative Method (named BIM), that iteratively takes multiple small
step sizes when adjusting the direction aer each iteration. Madry
et al. [49] proposed to apply the projected gradient descent algo-
rithm with random start (named PGD). Kurakin et al. [41] proposed
Iterative Least-Likely Class Method (named ILLC) for targeted aack
which does gradient descent on the benign image. Similar idea
can be applied to FGSM and BIM for targeted aacks. Dong et
al. [19] integrated the momentum techniques into BIM and ILLC
(named MBIM and MILLC) for the purpose of stabilizing the up-
dating direction and escaping from poor local maximum during
iterations. Pei et al. [58] introduced a neuron coverage criteria
and a gradient-based algorithm to solve joint optimization problem
(named DeepXplore), in order to cra corner real adversarial exam-
ples. Inspired by DeepXplore, Sun et al. [72] (named DeepCover)
and Ma et al. [48] (named DeepGauge) introduced more test cover-
age criteria and cra adversarial examples guided by their coverage
criterias using gradient-based algorithms.
BIM [41], ILLC [41] and their extensions MBIM and MILLC [19]
formalized the adversarial example searching problem in the dis-
crete domainD, yielding integer adversarial examples, therefore,
not aected by the discretization problem. However, to our knowl-
edge, all the BIM implementations we found actually cra real
adversarial examples. FGSM searches adversarial examples in the
continuous domainV, it seems that they are aware of the discretiza-
tion problem, as the perturbation ϵ of L∞ is sometimes selected
corresponding to the magnitude of the smallest bit of an 8-bit image,
e.g., ϵ = 8/255 on CIFAR-10 dataset. But, it is still a bit confusing
why 0.1 and other similar values is used under the L∞ distance
metric, which do not correspond to the magnitude of the smallest
bit of an 8-bit image. Moreover, ϵ in default is 0.3 in several tutorials
of FGSM on the MNIST and CIFAR10 in cleverhans maintained by
Goodfellow and Papernot [24]. e similar problem also exists in
PGD [49], DeepXplore [58], DeepCover [72], EAD [11] and Deep-
Gauge [48]. Indeed, the discretization problem of these works can
be fundamentally eliminated by selecting proper perturbation step
sizes so that the craed real adversarial examples are still adversarial
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Reference (Un)targeted Domain Distance Aected B→W Gap
Te
st
in
g
ba
se
d
m
et
ho
ds
W
hi
te
-b
ox
FGSM [25] Untargeted Continuous L∞ 7 - 7
BIM [41] Untargeted Discrete L∞ 7 - 7
PGD [49] Untargeted Continuous L∞ 3 - 3
ILLC [41] Targeted Discrete L∞ 7 - 7
MBIM/MILLC [19] Untargeted/Targeted Discrete L2, L∞ 7 - 7
C&W [10] Both Continuous L0, L2, L∞ 3 - 3
OptMargin [28] Untargeted Continuous L∞ 3 - 3
EAD [11] Both Continuous L1, L2 3 - 3
DeepXplore [58] Untargeted Continuous L1 3 - 3
DeepCover [72] Untargeted Continuous L∞ 3 - 3
DeepGauge [48] Untargeted Continuous L∞ 3 - 3
BLB [75] Targeted Continuous L2 3 - 3
JSMA [56] Targeted Continuous L0 7 - 7
DeepFool [50] Untargeted Continuous Lp≥1 3 - 3
UAP [51] Untargeted Continuous Lp≥1 3 - 3
DeepConcolic [73] Untargeted Continuous L0, L∞ 7 - 7
Bl
ac
k-
bo
x
PMGJCS [55] Both Continuous L1 3 3 3
PMG [54] Untargeted Continuous L1 3 3 3
One pixel [71] Both Discrete - 7 7 7
LSADV [52] Both Continuous - 3 3 3
ZOO [12] Targeted Continuous L2 3 3 3
FD [7] Both Continuous L2, L∞ 3 3 3
NES-PGD [33] Targeted Continuous L∞ 3 3 3
DBA [8] Targeted Continuous L2 3 3 3
Table 2: Summary of theoretical study results (I). (Un)targeted column shows the type of attack. Aect column shows whether
the method is aected by the discretization problem. Domain column shows the domain of images. Distance column shows
the considered distance metrics. B→W column shows whether black-box downgrades to white-box or not. Gap column shows
whether there is a gap between adversarial examples in the continuous domain and in the discrete domain.
Reference Domain Distance W/B-box Completeness Aected C→InC B→W Gap
Ve
ri
ca
tio
n
ba
se
d
m
et
ho
ds BILVNC [5] Continuous L∞ White 3 3 3 - 3DLV [31] Continuous L1, L2 White 7 7 - - 7
Planet [21] Continuous - White 3 3 3 - 3
MIPVerify [76] Continuous L∞ White 3 3 3 - 3
DeepZ [68] Continuous L∞ White 7 3 - - 3
DeepPoly [69] Continuous L∞ White 7 3 - - 3
DeepGo [63] Continuous - White 7 3 - - 3
SaveCV [80] Continuous Ln Black 7 3 - 3 7
ReluVal [78] Continuous Ln White 3 3 3 - 3
DSGMK [20] Continuous L∞ White 7 3 - - 3
Table 3: Summary of theoretical analysis results (II).Completeness column showswhether themethod is complete or not in the
corresponding domina. C→InC column shows whether complete methods downgrades to incomplete in the discrete domina.
aer denormalization post-processing, i.e., T(T−1(®vadv)) = ®vadv is
guaranteed.
Carlini & Wanger [10] proposed a set of white-box methods
(named C&W) for L0, L2 and L∞ distance metrics. ey formalized
the problem as an appropriate optimization problem to search for
high condence real adversarial examples with small magnitude of
perturbation. e optimization problem is solved by the Adam [37],
a rst-order gradient-based optimizer for stochastic objective func-
tions. Although they are aware of the discretization problem and
hence the aack success rate is measured on integer adversarial
examples. However, their algorithms ignored the discretization
problem and claimed that “it slightly degrades the quality of the
adversarial example”. Moreover, we nd that their tool cras real
adversarial examples without the denormalization post-processing.
Our experiments show that there is a big gap between adversar-
ial examples in the continues and in the discrete domains craed
by their tool (cf. Table 4), countering-claim to statements in [10].
Similar problem exists in OptMargin [28] which leverages the algo-
rithms of [10]. Although as mentioned in [10] this problem could
be eliminated by performing a greedy search on the laice dened
by the discrete solutions by changing one pixel value at a time.
To our knowledge, this idea has not been implemented, hence it’s
performance in terms of aack success rate and time performance
is unclear.
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Non-gradient-based methods. Szegedy et al. [75] proposed the
rst white-box non-gradient-based method using a box-constrained
L-BFGS algorithm (named BLB):
argminϵ>0
(
min(ϵ | ®vadv − ®v | + loss(®vadv, c)) subject to ®vadv ∈ V) .
Moosavi-Dezfooli et al. [50] proposed to search for the closest
distance from the source image to the decision boundary of the
targeted classier (named DeepFool). It iteratively rst calculates
decision boundaries of other classes and nd the closest one, then
calculate the distance r and move to cross the decision boundary.
Based on DeepFool, Moosavi-Dezfooli [50] also proposed an uni-
versal adversarial perturbation (named UAP) aack which can be
used to misclassify almost all images from the dataset.
All these methods cra examples in a continuous domain with-
out considering the discretization problem. In fact, DeepFool [50]
assumed that the classier д̂t in the continuous domain is the same
as the classier f̂t in the discrete domain, which contradicts to our
empirical results. It is possible to avoid the discretization problem
by checking examples aer denormalization post-processing, as
done by JSMA [56] and DeepConcolic [73]. By doing this, it may
spend a lot of time at craing spurious adversarial examples.
3.1.2 Testing basedBlack-boxMethods. Papernot et al. [55]
proposed the rst black-box method by leveraging transferability
property of adversarial examples. It rst trains a local substitute
model with a synthetic dataset and then cras adversarial examples
from the local substitute model. [54] generalized this idea to aack
other machine learning based classiers. However, transferability
is not always reliable, other methods such as gradient estimation
are explored as alternatives to substitute models. Narodytska &
Kasiviswanathan [52] proposed a gradient estimation aack using
a local-search based technique (named LSADV). Chen et al. [12]
proposed a black-box aack method (named ZOO) with zeroth or-
der optimization. In order to reduce the number of queries, Bhagoji
et al. [7] proposed a class of black-box aacks (called FD) that ap-
proximates FGSM and BIM via gradient estimation. Independently,
Ilyas et al. [33] proposed an alternative gradient estimation method
by leveraging NES [64, 81] and employed the white-box PGD at-
tack with estimated gradient (named NES-PGD). Brendel et al. [8]
proposed a decision-based aack (named DBA), that starts from the
target image, moves a small step to raw image every time and check
the perturbation cross the decision boundary or not. Su et al. [71]
proposed a black-box aack for generating one-pixel adversarial
images based on dierential evolution.
All these black-box methods (except for [71]) have access to
the normalizer of the targeted classier and the adversarial ex-
amples are craed in a continuous domain without considering
the discretization problem, therefore, black-box aacks (except
for [71]) downgrade to white-box ones and craed adversarial ex-
amples may be benign aer the denormalization post-processing.
In contrast, [71] cras adversarial images directly in the discrete
domain. We remark that the discretization problem in substitute
model based [54, 55] and gradient estimation based [7, 33] methods
could be fundamentally eliminated by choosing proper step sizes
for the underlying white-box methods once the normalization is
accessible, but it is non-trivial for ZOO [12] and DBA [8] due to
the underlying algorithms even with access to the normalization.
3.1.3 Verication based Methods. Verication based meth-
ods were proposed to provide reliable guarantees on the robust
of deep learning classiers by formal verication. When a neural
network is proved non-robust, an adversarial example could be
craed as a witness. A verication method/tool is complete, if all
the robust classiers can pass the verication, i.e., has no false
positives; otherwise it is incomplete. In this section, we analyze
the discretization problem on verication based methods for image
classication networks, hence other works such as NeVer [60] and
Reluplex [36] are excluded.
Complete methods includes BILVNC [5], ReluVal [78], Planet [21]
and MIPVerify [76], which typically leverage linear programming,
SMT solving and iterative renement. Incomplete methods include
DLV [31], DeepZ [68], DeepPoly [69], DeepGo [63], SaveCV [80]
and DSGMK [20], which typically verify an over-approximation of
the classier by leveraging abstract interpretation, linear approxi-
mations and duality.
e complete methods BILVNC [5], MIPVerify [76] and Planet [21]
consider the robust problem of classiers in a continuous domain,
hence indeed is an over-approximation of classiers in the discrete
domain. In other words, real adversarial examples craed by these
complete verication tools as the witness may be benign aer the
denormalization post-processing. is means that such complete
methods are incomplete for the classiers in the discrete domain. To
fundamentally eliminate this problem, the search space should be
discretized as done in DLV [31] or rened as done in ReluVal [78].
Although ReluVal [78] studied the robust problem of classiers
in the continuous domain, they indeed use symbolic interval to over
approximate the value ranges of pixels without normalization and
rene the output interval by repeated spliing of the input inter-
vals. ey did not consider non-integer values when verifying the
MNIST network, may resulting in spurious adversarial examples,
hence becomes incomplete. is problem could be fundamentally
eliminated by excluding non-integers during interval renement.
Furthermore, incomplete methods (except for DLV [31]) also
suer from the discretization problem. Indeed, the black-box in-
complete method, SaveCV [80], becomes white-box, although they
used denormalization before checking craed samples. While, other
white-box incomplete methods do not use any denormalization,
hence may cra spurious adversarial examples. DLV [31] aempts
to prove local robustness in a neighborhood of x by means of dis-
cretization: they reduce the innite neighborhood into a nite set
of points, and check that the classes of these points is consistent.
is process is then propagated through the network, layer by
layer. e discretization used during verication guarantees that
the craed adversarial examples are indeed adversarial aer the
denormalization post-processing.
3.2 Empirical Study
In this section, we conduct an empirical study on 20 representative
open source tools (listed in the rst column in Table 4) that can cra
adversarial example, in an aempt to understand the discretization
problem in the real-world. We consider the following three research
questions:
RQ1: Does perturbation step size aect aack success rate due to
the discretization problem?
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Methods SR TSR GAP Dataset Model Tool & Parameters
FGSM [25] 98.61% 98.58% 0.03% MNIST LeNet-1 Cleverhans, ϵ = 0.3 with 10000 images
BIM [41] 100% 14% 86% ImageNet ResNet Foolbox, ϵ = 0.3, α = 0.05
MBIM [19] 100% 14% 86% ImageNet ResNet Foolbox, ϵ = 0.3, α = 0.06
C&W-L2 [10] 100% 10% 90% ImageNet ResNet Foolbox
C&W-L∞ [10] 100% 68% 32% ImageNet ResNet Original tool, L∞ = 10/255
OptMargin [28] 100% 90% 10% CIFAR ResNet Original, optens aack.py with 20 images
DeepXplore [58] 33% 7% 78.79% ImageNet ResNet50, VGG16, VGG19 Original, 100 seeds
BLB [75] 100% 49% 51% ImageNet ResNet Foolbox, ϵ = 0.00001, maxiter=150
DeepFool [50] 100% 1% 99% ImageNet ResNet Foolbox
DeepConcolic [73] 2% 2% 0% MNIST mnist complicated.h5 Original, criterion=‘nc’ with 10000 images
One-pixel [71] 3% 3% 0% MNIST LeNet-1 AdvBox, max pixels=9 with 100 images
ZOO [12] 73% 3.3% 95.47% ImageNet InceptionV3 Original
NES-PGD [33] 100% 77% 23% ImageNet InceptionV3 Original, L∞ = 10/255
DBA [8] 100% 44% 56% ImageNet ResNet Original
DLV [31] 90% 90% 0% MNIST Original Original, SR not 100% as time out, 20 images
Planet [21] 100% 46% 54% MNIST testNetworkB.rlv Use ‘GIVE’ model obtain 20 images
MIPVerify [76] 42% 0% 100% MNIST MNIST.n1 ickstart demo with 100 images
DeepPoly [69] 45% 44% 2.22% MNIST convBigRELU DiAI Use ϵ = 0.3 and ϵ = 76/255 with 100 images
DeepGo [63] 25.4% 25.2% 0.78% MNIST Original craed 1000 images from 1 image
SafeCV [80] 100% 100% 0% MNIST Original 100 images
Table 4: Experiment results on the discretization problem, where Original means the original targeted model without name
and tool of the paper, SR means the attack success rate of real adversarial examples, TSR means the attack success rate of
integer adversarial examples, GAP means gap between SR and TSR, all parameters are default values provided by the raw
paper or third-party toolkits.
RQ2: To what extent do the discretization problem aect the aack
success rate?
RQ3: Is the discretization problem ubiquitous?
3.2.1 Dataset and Seing. Due to diversity (e.g., capabilities, e-
ciencies, types of networks, platform) of these tools, the dataset and
targeted classiers may be dierent. For ImageNet images [18], we
use 100 images that all can be correctly classied by four classiers
of Keras (i.e., ResNet50, IncepetionV3, VGG16 and VGG19) [15]. For
MNIST [44] and CIFAR [39] images, the number of used images are
shown in the last column in Table 4. All the targeted models are
the models provided by the original tools or third-party toolkits
or trained according to the instructions of the original tools. In all
the experiments of aacks, we conduct untargeted aacks, except
that we conduct targeted aacks for Planet. For verication tools
that cannot directly aack the model, we use their specic seing
(see below). Remark that we sometimes use the implementations in
toolkits instead of the original tools, for ease of experiments, and
we assume that implementations in toolkits are same or beer than
their original implementations.
In order to conduct experiments as fair as possible, we manage
to be consistent with these papers’ original environment. All the
parameters we used in our experiments are the default values of
the original tools or third-party toolkits, such as Cleverhans and
Foolbox [61].
Furthermore, we introduce the following metrics to evaluate the
discretization problem.
• Success Rate (SR). Let Na denote the number of input images
under test, Nv denote the number of images on which real ad-
versarial examples are craed successfully by the aack method.
e Success Rate (SR) is calculated as Nv/Na .
• True Success Rate (TSR). Let Na denote the number of input
images, Ni denote the number of integer adversarial examples
which are obtained from the real adversarial examples by the de-
normalization post-processing, but the benign ones are omied.
e True Success Rate (TSR) is calculated as Ni/Na .
• GAP. e GAP between SR and TSR is calculated as SR−TSRSR .
3.2.2 Result and Analysis. Our experimental results are shown
in Table 4 and Figure 2.
RQ1: As mentioned in the above section, FGSM [25], BIM [41],
ILLC [41], MBIM and MILLC [19] can cra adversarial examples
in the continuous domain that are still adversarial aer the de-
normalization post-processing by choosing perturbation step sizes
corresponding to the magnitudes of the smallest bit of an 8-bit
image. erefore, we conduct experiments using FGSM, BIM and
MBIM with the perturbation step size 0.3, 0.05 and 0.06 respectively,
and the maximum perturbation of BIM and MBIM is 0.3, where 0.3
does not not correspond to the magnitude of the smallest bit of an
8-bit image, but is commonly used as the default step size in several
papers and tools.
We can see in Table 4 that the gap of FGSM is small, but the gap
of BIM and MBIM is very large. We notice that BIM and MBIM take
multiple iterations to cra an adversarial example and during each
iteration, a small step size (i.e., 0.05 and 0.06) is used in order to
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Figure 2: Histogram plot of experimental results.
minimize the distortion, and the iteration stops immediately once
an adversarial example is craed, while FGSM cras adversarial
examples using a relative larger step size 0.3 in one step. It seems
that adversarial examples with larger distortions are more robust
in terms of the discretization problem. erefore, perturbation step
size signicantly aects the aack success rate.
RQ2: From Table 4 and Figure 2, we can observe that the eect of
the discretization problem dier in tools. e gaps range from 0%
up to 100%. ere are ten tools whose gap exceeds 50%, and six
tools whose gap exceeds 80%.
Unsurprisingly, DeepConcolic, DLV and SafeCV that considered
the discretization problem, do not have any gap. One-pixel has no
gap as it directly cras adversarial examples in the discrete domain.
Except them, only three tools, FGSM, DeepPoly, and DeepGo that
did not consider the discretization problem have gap less than
10%. As aforementioned, FGSM cras adversarial examples using a
relative larger step size 0.3 in one step, therefore, the adversarial
examples craed by FGSM are more robust.
DeepPoly is a tool for verifying local robustness of the classier,
but cannot directly return craed real adversarial examples when
the input image fail to pass verication under the specic distance.
Hence, we cannot directly compute TR and TSR. Alternatively,
we compute TR using the number of images that cannot pass the
verication under the L∞ distance 0.3, and compute STR using
using the number of images that cannot pass the verication under
the L∞ distance 76/255. e tiny gap between the L∞ distances 0.3
and 76/255 is regarded as the gap between TR and TSR.
DeepGo is a tool for computing the output range of a sub-space.
We use one image and featureIndexZ =2 of DeepGo as the input
sub-space and cra 1000 images from the sub-space, where Fea-
tureIndexZ =2 is a random distance of 8 pixels (cf. [63]). TR (resp.
TSR) is computed using the number of real (resp. integer) adversar-
ial examples from these 1000 images.
RQ3: All the tools that did not consider the discretization problem
have, more and less, gaps. ese tools implemented either gradient-
based (such as BIM, MBIM, C&W, and DeepXplore) or non-gradient-
based (such as BLB, DeepFool and ZOO), or verication-based (such
as MIPVerify) methods. Also, some of them are white-box aacks
(such as BIM, MBIM, C&W, DeepXplore and MIPVerify) and some
of them are black-box aacks (such as ZOO, NES-PGD and DBA).
erefore, the discretization problem is ubiquitous no maer test
based or verication based, and black-box or white-box.
Discussion. Our study reveals that the discretization problem is
ubiquitous and more severe than originally thought, e.g., [10, 50].
According to our ndings, we suggest that aack success rate
should be measured using integer adversarial examples instead
of real adversarial examples. is can be easily achieved by denor-
malizing real examples back into integer images berfore checking
whether the craed examples are adversarial or not. We suggest
that it is beer to design and implement methods that directly cra
integer adversarial examples, which may have beer performance
in terms of time than that directly cra real examples and later
check them aer the denormalization post-processing. Gradient-
based methods can be easily revised by restricting the perturbation
step sizes as the magnitudes of the smallest bit of an 8-bit image.
However, for non-gradient-based methods, we believe it is non-
trivial to adjust due to the following reasons. One reason is that
there are too many hyper-parameters that inuence the perturba-
tion step size, and it is dicult to correctly set proper values for
these hyper-parameters in order to guarantee that the perturba-
tion step sizes correspond to magnitudes of the smallest bit of an
8-bit image. e another reason is that some tools use third-party
solvers to get perturbation step sizes which is much dicult to x,
unless the solvers are revised. For verication based tools, spurious
adversarial examples should be checked and excluded.
4 AN APPROACH FOR BLACK-BOX ATTACK
According to our study in Section 3, all the black-box aacks (except
one pixel [71]) downgrade to white-box. Indeed, they assumed
that normalization and/or denormalization can be accessed by the
adversary which is not always feasible in practice. While the aack
success rate of one pixel [71] is very low compared with other
methods.
To cra integer adversarial examples in black-box scenario, we
can only query the classier for input images and get the prob-
abilities of top-k classes for each input image. en, we have to
compute integer perturbations of images in the discrete domain,
which always results in integer adversarial examples. As a rst
step towards addressing this problem, in this section, we propose a
black-box algorithm for craing integer adversarial examples for
both target and untargeted aacks by leveraging a model-based
derivative-free discrete optimization method (DFO) [83]. DFO is
widely used to solve complex constrained optimization tasks in a
sampling-feedback-style. It does not rely on the gradient of the
objective function, but instead, learns from samples of the search
space. erefore, it is suitable for optimizing functions that are
non-dierentiable, with many local minima, or even unknown but
only testable.
In the rest of this section, we rst introduce the framework of
our approach, then present the formulation, and nally show our
algorithm.
reat model. In our black-box scenario, we assume that the
adversary knows the input format of the target image classier
and has access to the probabilities of top-k classes for each input
image, but he/she does not have any access to the normalization,
denormalization, architecture, parameters and training data of the
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Figure 3: Framework of our approach DFA.
classier. e distortion of adversarial examples is measured by
L∞ distance metric.
4.1 Framework of DFA
Figure 3 shows the framework of our approach named DFA, which
stands for Derivative-Free Aack. Given an image, DFA rst ran-
domly generates a set of perturbations from the search space speci-
ed by the L∞ distance. en it cras a set of images by adding
these perturbations onto the original image. Next, starting from the
set of craed images, DFA repeats the following procedure until an
integer adversarial example is found (i.e., an image with minimal
dissatisfaction degree) or the number of iterations is reached. Dur-
ing each iteration, DFA queries the black-box classier to assess the
craed images via the given dissatisfaction degree function which
species the minimal optimization goal. e set of perturbations
is partitioned into two sets in the order of their corresponding im-
ages’ dissatisfaction degrees: one set consisting of perturbations
that yield images with high dissatisfaction degrees and the an-
other set consisting of perturbations that yield images with low
dissatisfaction degrees. e search space is rened into a sub-space
according to these two sets. New perturbations are sampled from
the sub-space. From these new perturbations together with old per-
turbations, a set of best-so-far perturbations is selected by adding
them into the original image and querying the black-box classier
and the dissatisfaction degree function. Finally, the procedure is
repeated again on the set of best-so-far perturbations.
4.2 Formulation
In this section, we formalize the integer adversarial example search-
ing problem as a derivative-free optimization problem by dening
the dissatisfaction degree functions. We rst introduce some nota-
tions.
Let us x a classier ft : D→ Ct for some image classication
task t . Given an image ®d , we denote P( ®d) the |Ct |-dimension
probability vector of the classier on the image ®d . For every class c ∈
Ct , let P( ®d, c) denote the probability that the image ®d is classied
to the class c . For a given integer 1 ≤ j ≤ |Ct |, we denote Topj ( ®d)
the j-th largest probability in P( ®d) and Top`j ( ®d) the class whose
probability is Topj ( ®d) . Obviously, Top`1 ( ®d) = ft ( ®d).
To cra an adversarial image, we need to locate a perturbation
δ . Let us x the L∞ distance ϵ ∈ N. We dene the initial search
space ∆ of perturbations as the discrete domainNw×h×ch[−ϵ,ϵ ] .
Given a perturbation δ ∈ ∆, we denote by norm( ®d +δ ), the image
aer adding the perturbation δ onto the image ®d , namely, for every
coordinate p ∈ P
norm( ®d + δ )[p] :=

®d[p] + δ [p], if 0 ≤ ®d[p] + δ [p] ≤ 255;
0, if ®d[p] + δ [p] < 0;
255, if ®d[p] + δ [p] > 255.
e integer adversarial example searching problem is to search
some perturbation δ ∈ ∆ such that:
• Top`1 (norm( ®d + δ )) , ft ( ®d) for untargeted aack;
• Top`1 (norm( ®d + δ )) = c for targeted aack with the target class c .
We solve the integer adversarial example searching problem by
reduction to a model-based derivative-free discrete optimization
problem. e reduction is given by dening an optimization goal
which is characterized by dissatisfaction-degree functions. We rst
consider the untargeted case.
e goal of untargeted aack is to search some perturbation
δ such that Top`1 (norm( ®d + δ )) , ft ( ®d). To do this, we minimize
the probability of norm( ®d + δ ) being classied as the class ft ( ®d)
and maximize the probability of norm( ®d + δ ) being classied as the
top-2 class, namely, Top`2 (norm( ®d + δ )). erefore, we dene the
dissatisfaction-degree function for untargeted aack as follows:
• Dua( ®d,δ ) := 0 if Top`1 (norm( ®d + δ )) , ft ( ®d);
• Dua( ®d,δ ) := Top1(norm( ®d + δ )) − Top2(norm( ®d + δ )), otherwise.
For targeted aack with the target class c , instead of maximizing
the probability of norm( ®d + δ ) being classied as the top-2 class,
we will maximize the probability of norm( ®d + δ ) being classied as
the target class. erefore, the dissatisfaction-degree function for
targeted aack is dened as follows:
• Dta( ®d,δ ) := 0 if Top`1 (norm( ®d + δ )) = c;
• Dta( ®d,δ ) := Top1(norm( ®d + δ )) − P(norm( ®d + δ ), c), otherwise.
Now, the integer adversarial example searching problem is re-
duced to the minimization problem of the dissatisfaction-degree
functions.
4.3 Algorithm
In this section, we present our algorithm (shown in Algorithm 1) for
craing integer adversarial examples by leveraging a derivative-free
optimization method (DFO) [83].
In detail, we rst randomly select (s + k) perturbations (Line
1) from the initial search space ∆, which is then evaluated by the
dissatisfaction-degree function D (Lines 2-3). If the perturbation
with the smallest dissatisfaction-degree suces to cra an inte-
ger adversarial example, return this perturbation directly (Lines
6-8). Otherwise, we partition the set Bt−1 of selected perturba-
tions into two sets: “positive” set B+t−1 and “negative” set B
−
t−1,
where B+t−1 consists of the smallest-k perturbations in terms of the
dissatisfaction-degree (Line 9-10).
Our DFO engine renes the search space ∆ into a sub-space
using B+t−1 and B
−
t−1. en, we randomly choose: a perturbation
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Algorithm 1: A DFO-based algorithm
Input: classier under aack ft , original image ®d ,
number of iterations T , ranking threshold k ,
sample size in each iteration s , search space ∆,
dissatisfaction-degree (d.d.) function D
Output: optimized perturbation x˜
1: B0 = {δ1,δ2, ...,δs ,δs+1, ...,δs+k } randomly sampled from ∆
//initial collection
2: Compute images norm( ®d + δi ) for 1 ≤ i ≤ s + k
3: Evaluate the dissatisfaction-degree D( ®d,δi )
4: x˜ = argminδ ∈B0D( ®d,δ )//select the best sample so far
5: for t = 1 to T do
6: if D( ®d, x˜) = 0 then
7: break //nd an adversarial example
8: end if
9: B+t−1 =smallest-k solutions in Bt−1 in terms of d.d.
10: B−t−1 = Bt−1 − B+t−1
11: B = ∅
12: for i = 1 to s do
13: Rened search space of ∆ by B+t−1 and B
−
t−1
14: //Rene the value of each coordinate respectively.
15: Randomly select a perturbation δ ′ from B+t−1, a subset Y
of coordinates of δ ′, a value vp from ∆ for each
coordinate p ∈ Y
16: δ ′′ = Update δ ′ with (vp )p∈Y
17: B = B ∪ {δ ′′}
18: end for
19: Compute images norm( ®d + δ ) for all δ ∈ B
20: Evaluate the dissatisfaction-degree D( ®d,δ ) for all δ ∈ B
21: Bt = smallest-(s + k) solutions in B ∪ Bt−1 in terms of d.d.
22: //keep the size as s + k
23: x˜ = argminδ ∈BtD( ®d,δ )
24: end for
25: return x˜
δ ′ from B+t−1 as the base, a subset of the coordinates p that will be
modied, a random value vp from the rened search space ∆ for
each selected coordinate p and nally add them onto δ ′, resulting
in a new perturbation δ ′′ which is stored in B. Aer repeating this
s times, we get s new perturbations (Lines 12-18). Now, we have
(2s + k) perturbations in the set B ∪ Bt−1. From them, we choose
the smallest-(s + k) perturbations in terms of the dissatisfaction-
degree. We will continue the iteration on Bt until we nd an integer
adversarial example or the number of iterations T is reached.
4.4 Illustrative Example
We illustrate Algorithm 1 procedure through an example, as shown
in Figure 4. e original image ®d is classied as the class amingo.
e sample size s is set to 3, the ranking threshold k is set to 2.
Consider the rst iteration, Algorithm 1 randomly generates 3
perturbations (δ0,δ1,δ2), and add them onto the original image,
resulting in three new images. Algorithm 1 computes the dissatis-
faction degrees of these three new images {norm( ®d + δ0), norm( ®d +
δ1), norm( ®d + δ2)} by querying the classier. Among these 3 pertur-
bations, norm( ®d + δ0) has the smallest dissatisfaction degree value,
hence δ0 is best perturbation so far. Aer more iterations, the result
is shown in Figure 5. We can see that aer the 354-th iteration, the
craed image with smallest dissatisfaction degree is classied as
the class hook, but is visually indistinguishable from the original
one.
Figure 4: Illustrative example of an untargeted attack on a
Flamingo image (during the rst iteration).
4.5 Scenario Extension
Our framework is very reexible and can be adapted to dierent
problems, classiers and scenarios easily such as one-pixel aack,
aack with dierent lighting condition, occlusion with a single
small rectangle, occlusion with multiple tiny black rectangles, more
restricted black-box aacks, and so on. ese scenario requirements
can be easily included into our method by put special restrictions
on the search space and/or dissatisfaction-degree functions.
For instance, if the adversary only have access to the class with
the largest probability instead of the complete probability vector of
all the classes. e dissatisfaction-degree function for untargeted
aack can be adapted as follows:
• D1ua( ®d,δ ) := 0 if Top`1 (norm( ®d + δ )) , ft ( ®d);
• D1ua( ®d,δ ) := Top1(norm( ®d + δ )), otherwise.
e dissatisfaction-degree function for targeted aack can be adapted
similarly.
For one pixel aack, in our algorithm, we can restrict the under-
lying DFO engine to change only one pixel in each iteration. Since
our method is a black-box method, in general, it can be applied to
any scenarios as long as the input and output of the target classi-
er can be observed. Even a model internally consists of multiple
model interactions, e.g., classiers with defense, we can still treat
the whole as a single model and apply our approach.
5 IMPLEMENTATION AND EVALUATION
5.1 Implementation
We implement our method into a black-box style adversary example
generation tool DFA. We also implement a derivative-free optimiza-
tion engine in DFA based on RACOS [83], for which we manage to
engineer to signicantly improve its eciency and scalability with
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Figure 5: Illustrative example of an untargeted attack on a Flamingo image.
lots of domain-specic optimizations. Due to the space limitation,
details of the optimizations are omied here.
In order to process pre-trained networks (e.g., InceptionV3), we
also integrate TensorFlow (V1.8.0) [1] and Keras (V2.1.6) [15] DL
frameworks in our tool for image prediction. Besides integer ad-
versarial example generation for well-known image classication
models, our tool can be easily expanded to adapt non-image classi-
cation models as well, by customizing the interfaces in our tool,
e.g., the dissatisfaction-degree function.
5.2 Dataset & Setting
We use two datasets MNIST and ImageNet in this section.
MNIST. MNIST [44] is a dataset of handwrien digits and contains
28 × 28 × 1 pixel images with 10 classes (0-9). We choose the rst
200 images out of 10000 validation images of MNIST as our subjects.
We evaluate MNIST images using LeNet-1, a DNN classier from
the LeNet family [43].
ImageNet. ImageNet [18] is a large image dataset. e size of
images in ImageNet is around 299 × 299 × 3 or 224 × 224 × 3 pixels.
ImageNet contains over 10000000 images with 1000 classes. We
choose 100 images which can be correctly classied by four clas-
siers of Keras (i.e., ResNet50, IncepetionV3, VGG16 and VGG19).
We use two well-known pre-trained DNN, ResNet50 [27] and In-
ceptionV3 [74] as the target DNN classiers in our experiments.
We conduct both untargeted aack and targeted aack in the
experiments, on a Linux PC running UBUNTU 16.04 LTS with Intel
Xeon(R) W-2123 CPU, TITAN Xp COLLECTORS GPU and 64G
RAM. Table 5 lists the other seings used.
Besides the SR, TSR, and GAP metrics dened in Section 3, we use
ATC to denote the average time cost per real adversarial example
in second for other tools, and the average time cost per integer
adversarial example in second for our tool.
5.3 Comparison with White-Box Methods
Although our method is black-box based, we compare the perfor-
mance of our tool with two well-known gradient-based white-box
tools: FGSM [25] and C&W [10]. eL∞ distances are transformed
into their L∞ distances accordingly.
e results are shown in Table 6 and Table 7 for untargeted and
targeted aacks, respectively. In terms of traditional aack success
rate (SR), DFA is comparable with FGSM [25] and C&W [10]. In
terms of aack true success rate (TSR), our tool DFA outperforms
Parameter Setting
L∞ distance ϵ = 64 for MNIST and ϵ = 10 for ImageNet.
Target For MNIST, the class with 4-th highest probability.
class For ImageNet,the class with 11-th highest probability.
Sample s = 3 for untargeted aack.
size s s = 10 for targeted aack.
Ranking
reshold
k = 2 in all the experiments.
Coordinate
reshold
e number of coordinates that can be modied in
the perturbation during each iteration is about 0.2%,
i.e., 2 pixels for MNIST and 600 pixels for ImageNet.
Iteration T = 10000 in all the experiments.
reshold
Timeout 3 minutes for MNIST .
reshold 30 minutes for ImageNet.
Table 5: Experiment Setting.
Table 6: Results of white-box untargeted attacks.
Dataset DNN Method SR TSR GAP ATC
MNIST LeNet-1
C&W 100% 85% 15% 14.3
FGSM 96.7% 96.7% 0% 0
DFA 100% 100% 0% 1.2
ImageNet ResNet50
C&W 99% 94% 5.05% 8.56
FGSM 95% 95% 0% 0.08
DFA 90% 90% 0% 65
ImageNet InceptionV3
C&W 100% 68% 32% 1.41
FGSM 79% 79% 0% 0.15
DFA 93% 93% 0% 106.8
them in most cases. It is not surprising that our black-box tool DFA
requires more time than other white-box methods.
Similar to the results given in Table 4, we can see that C&W has
a huge gap of targeted aacks on InceptionV3 in L∞ seing, as
its TSR is only 24% compared with 100% SR. us, although C&W
outperforms DFA in terms of SR, DFA outperforms C&W in most
cases in terms of TSR.
5.4 Comparison with Black-Box Methods
We compare DFA with several well-known black-box methods: sub-
stitute model-based aacks, ZOO [12], NES-PGD [33] and DBA [8].
In order to avoid the side-eect of the selected white-box meth-
ods when evaluating substitute model, we use both the FGSM and
C&W methods respectively. For ImageNet, we use ResNet50 as the
substitute model for InceptionV3 and vice versa. e substitute
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Table 7: Results of white-box targeted attacks.
Dataset DNN Method SR TSR GAP ATC
MNIST LeNet-1
C&W 100% 70% 0% 24.5
FGSM 3% 3% 0% 0
DFA 100% 100% 0% 3
ImageNet ResNet50
C&W 99% 62% 37.37% 19.85
FGSM 0% - - -
DFA 90% 90% 0% 118
ImageNet InceptionV3
C&W 100% 24% 76% 14.88
FGSM 0% - - -
DFA 72% 72% 0% 375
Table 8: Results of black-box untargeted attacks.
Dataset DNN Method SR TSR GAP ATC
MNIST LeNet-1
SModel+C&W 2.5% 2.5% 0% 28
SModel+FGSM 20% 20% 0% 1
DBA 99.5% 84% 15.58% 11.89
ZOO 100% 89.5% 10.5% 15.9
DFA 100% 100% 0% 1.2
ImageNet ResNet50
SModel+C&W 2% 1% 50% 1.29
SModel+FGSM 24% 24% 0% 0.12
DBA 100% 44% 56% 137.79
DFA 97% 97% 0% 150.66
ImageNet InceptionV3
SModel+C&W 6% 6% 0% 24.32
SModel+FGSM 38% 38% 0% 0.37
DBA 100% 34% 66% 254.2
ZOO 73% 3% 95.79% 113
NES-PGD 100% 77% 23% 24
DFA 93% 93% 0% 106.8
model for LeNet-1 is from the evaluation of ZOO [12]. Since our
tool uses L∞ distance, DBA and ZOO use L2 distance. We map the
L∞ distances used in DFA to the corresponding approximated L2
distances in the experiments. We remark that not all these tools
provide related parameters for certain problems, in such cases, we
do not give their experimental results.
e results of untargeted and targeted aacks are given in Table 8
and Table 9 respectively. We can see that our tool DFA signicantly
outperforms all the other tools in terms of TSR no maer targeted
or untargeted aacks. Substitute model based aacks can achieve at
most 38% TSR under untargeted seing, and 3% TSR under targeted
seing. Compared with ZOO [12], NES-PGD [33] and DBA [61],
our tool DFA can achieve similar or higher aack success rate in
almost all the cases in terms of SR. However, all these methods suer
from the discretization problem, they usually have gaps between
SR and TSR. For instance, the aack success rate of NES-PGD is
dramatically dropped from 73% to 3% on InceptionV3 in targeted
seing.
5.5 Eciency Analysis
Time cost. From Table 6 to Table 9, we can see that the time
cost of DFA varies in dierent cases. On small models and images
from MNIST, the average time cost of DFA is very small, around
1–3 seconds; while on larger models and images from ImageNet,
the time cost is increased to at most 375 seconds. e reason is
that we change the values of two coordinates for each sample on
MNIST images, while change the values of 600 coordinates for each
sample on ImageNet images. us, it spends more time to handle
Table 9: Results of black-box targeted attacks.
Dataset DNN Method SR TSR GAP ATC
MNIST LeNet-1
SModel+C&W 1.5% 1.5% 0% 22
SModel+FGSM 3% 3% 0% 1
DBA 95.5% 79% 17.28% 12.17
ZOO 100% 94.5% 5.5% 17.4
DFA 100% 100% 0% 3
ImageNet ResNet50
SModel+C&W 2% 2% 0% 27.21
SModel+FGSM - - - -
DBA 95% 21% 77.89% 335
DFA 87% 87% 0% 211.32
ImageNet InceptionV3
SModel+C&W 1% 1% 0% 41.66
SModel+FGSM - - - -
DBA 87% 25% 71.3% 544
ZOO 62% 6% 90.32% 716.04
NES-PGD 100% 47% 53% 56
DFA 72% 72% 0% 375
Table 10: Comparison with NES-PGD and Bandit with aver-
age query times of success cases.
Dataset DNN Method Untargeted aack Targeted aack
ImageNet InceptionV3
NES-PGD 4741 13421
Bandit 3255 -
Our tool 2660 11364
Table 11: Results of DFA on dierent L∞ distances
ϵ Max times Mean of times ATC
32 85933 4691 4.41
64 3902 682 1.2
76 2213 466 0.61
these modications, and the time cost is signicantly increased
on ImageNet images. We remark that under black-box scenarios,
the time cost of our tool DFA is on the same level as other non-
substitute model-based tools in most cases, moreover, the time cost
of DFA is the average time cost per integer adversarial example
instead of real adversarial example.
Comparing query times wtih NES-PGD [33] and Bandit [34].
In many black-box scenarios, there may exist a limitation of query
times to avoid detection. erefore, in the context of black-box
aacks, query eciency should be considered. We compare the
number of queries of DFA against two of the most query-ecient
methods: NES-PGD [33] and Bandit [34], where NES-PGD is a
natural evolutionary-based tool and Bandit is an optimized version
of NES-PGD by using bandit optimization. NES-PGD and Bandit
are black-box aack tools which focus on query-limited scenarios.
We use InceptionV3 as the targeted classier and conduct both
untargeted and targeted aacks using NES-PGD, Bandit and our
tool DFA. [e parameter seing of Bandit for targeted aack is
not given therein, therefore we only conduct untargeted aacks
for Bandit.] e average query times per successful aack used by
each tool is given in Table 10. We can see that DFA outperforms the
other two tools in terms for query times. It is worth mentioning
that the query times of our tool is computed on integer adversarial
examples, while it is computed on real adversarial examples for
NES-PGD and Bandit.
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Table 12: L2 distance on dierent examples
RAW 1 2 3 4 5 ery Times
RAW 0.00 1.20 1.23 1.21 1.21 1.24 -
1 1.20 0.00 1.33 1.36 1.36 1.33 329
2 1.23 1.33 0.00 1.31 1.37 1.40 226
3 1.21 1.36 1.31 0.00 1.38 1.36 398
4 1.21 1.36 1.37 1.38 0.00 1.34 422
5 1.24 1.33 1.40 1.36 1.34 0.00 327
Performance ofDFA on dierentL∞ distances. To understand
the performance of our tool DFA on dierent L∞ distances, we run
DFA with ϵ = 32, 64, 76 on the 200 MNIST images with untargeted
aacks. e results are shown in Table 11. It is easy to see that
the larger of the L∞ distance, the more ecient of DFA. When
ϵ = 64, 76, DFA only take several hundreds of queries and nearly 1
second to cra an integer adversarial example without computing
gradient. On MNIST dataset, DFA is faster than many white-box
aacks and as our best known,
Uniform Distribution. Unlike FGSM that can only cra one ad-
versarial examples for each input image under same step size, DFA
is able to cra dierent adversarial examples for each input image
under same parameters, due to its inherent random characteristic.
For each MNIST image, we use DFA to cra ve adversarial exam-
ples consecutively with same parameters as shown in Table 5. e
L2 distances between these examples and the original image are
shown in Table 12. We can observe that the distances are very uni-
form. is demonstrates that DFA quickly cra multiple dierent
adversarial examples for a given image.
5.6 Attack Classiers with Defense
To show the eectiveness of our approach, we rst use our tool
to aack the HGD defense [47], which won the rst place of NIPS
2017 competition on defense against adversarial aacks.
In this experiment, we conduct untargeted aacks on this model
using the same 100 images from ImageNet as previously. e L∞
distance ϵ is 32 according to the competition’s seing. e coordi-
nate threshold is set to 200. Our tool achieves 72% aack success
rate with 30 minute time limitation for each aack. e aack
success rate signicantly increases to 95% with 200 minutes time
limitation. is demonstrates that DFA is able to handle dicult
problems with enough computation resource.
On MNIST Adversarial Examples Challenge [42], another widely
recognized aack problem, we use the same 200 MNIST images as
previously. Our tool DFA achieves 10.5% aack success rate, the
same as the current best white-box aack “interval aacks”, which
is publicly reported on the webpage of the challenge. Indeed, the
images craed by both methods are exactly the same, and the time
costs of both tools are also similar.
6 CONCLUSION
We conducted the rst comprehensive study of 34 methods and
20 open source tools for craing adversarial examples on the dis-
cretization problem. Our study reveals that most of these methods
and tools suer from the discretization problem and researchers
should pay more aention on the discretization problem when de-
signing testing/verication methods and measuring aack success
rate.
We proposed a black-box method by leveraging a derivative-free
optimization based method. Our method does not have the dis-
cretization problem and is able to aack a wide range of classiers
including non-dierentiable ones. Our aack method requires ac-
cess to the probability distribution of classes for each test input
and does not rely on the gradient of the objective function, but
instead, learns from samples of the search space. We implement our
method into tool DFA, and conduct an intensive set of experiments
on MNIST and ImageNet in both untargeted and targeted scenarios.
e experimental results show that our method is comparable to
the white-box methods (FGSM and C&W) and signicantly out-
performs the state-of-the-art black-box methods. Moreover, our
method achieved 95% success rate on the defense model [47] and
achieved the same result as the best white-box aack in MNIST
Challenge.
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